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Abstract  
Critics of appraisal theory have difficulty accepting appraisal (with its constructive flavor) as 
an automatic process, and hence as a potential cause of most emotions. In response, some appraisal 
theorists have argued that appraisal was never meant as a causal process but as a constituent of 
emotional experience. Others have argued that appraisal is a causal process, but that it can be either 
rule-based or associative, and that the associative variant can be automatic. I first propose 
investigating empirically whether rule-based appraisal can also be automatic. I then propose 
investigating the automatic nature of constructive (instead of rule-based) appraisal because the 
distinction between rule-based and associative is problematic. Finally, I discuss experiments that 
support the view that constructive appraisal can be automatic. 
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Automatic constructive appraisal as a candidate cause of emotion 
I sketch the contours of a debate revolving around the question whether appraisal theory 
offers a plausible account of emotion causation. I specifically focus on the criticism that appraisal is a 
non-automatic, rule-based process and therefore not a plausible cause of emotions, at least not of 
those emotions that arise automatically. In the first part of the paper, I discuss two strategies that 
appraisal theorists have adopted in response to this criticism and propose two alternative strategies of 
my own. In the second part, I summarize empirical data that were set up in the spirit of the last 
strategy. 
My aim is to remove one criticism against the idea that appraisal is a cause of emotions. In 
doing so, I hope to render this idea more plausible. This is not the same thing as actively 
demonstrating that appraisal is the cause of emotions. This would require a different type of research 
(see Conclusion section). Before turning to the criticism and the strategies, I clarify what I think 
appraisal theory is all about.  
Appraisal Theory 
Appraisal theory has made two important contributions to our understanding of emotions 
compared to older theories, such as those of James (1890/1950) and Schachter (1964). These older 
theories proposed that stimuli in some unspecified way cause physical arousal. In James‘s theory, 
feedback of this arousal produces the emotional experience. In Schachter‘s theory, the additional step 
of interpretation of this arousal in light of the situation produces the emotional experience. An 
important lacuna in these theories is that they do not ask which stimuli lead to physical arousal in the 
first place and by what process the organism determines this (Kappas, 2006; Moors, in press; Power 
& Dalgleish, 1997). A first contribution of appraisal theory was to put a finger on this problem and to 
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call into being a separate phase in which a stimulus must be evaluated before an emotion (or arousal) 
can arise. The process charged with this evaluation was called ―appraisal‖ (Arnold, 1960). 
A second contribution of appraisal theory was to submit a concrete proposal about which 
stimuli do and which do not elicit an emotion, and which stimuli elicit specific emotions such as 
anger, fear, sadness, and joy. Appraisal theorists soon discovered that it is impossible to make a fixed 
list of stimuli that elicit emotions, or the same ones, in everyone. They emphasized that there are few 
if any one-to-one mappings between stimuli and emotions (Roseman & C. A. Smith, 2001). The 
same stimulus can elicit an emotion in some individuals or on some occasions but not in other 
individuals or on other occasions. The same stimulus can lead to different emotions in different 
individuals or on different occasions. Different stimuli can lead to the same emotion. Appraisal 
theorists have tried to discover the commonalities among stimuli that elicit an emotion or the same 
emotion, as well as the crucial differences among stimuli that elicit a vs. no emotion or that elicit 
different emotions. This exercise has led to the suggestion that emotions are reliably produced by 
constellations of (at least) two elements: a stimulus and a goal for which the stimulus is relevant 
(Frijda, 1986). For example, meeting a bear in the woods is not inherently emotion provoking; it is 
only so because it is relevant for one‘s goal for physical safety. Moreover, specific emotions are not 
evoked by specific classes of stimuli but instead by specific constellations of stimuli and goals. A 
constellation of match between a stimulus and a goal leads to a positive emotion whereas a 
constellation of mismatch leads to a negative emotion, irrespective of the specific stimuli or the 
specific goals at stake. A bear in the woods elicits a negative emotion because it constitutes a 
mismatch with one‘s goal for physical safety, but so does any stimulus that constitutes a mismatch 
with some goal. Appraisal theorists have proposed sophisticated rules for the further differentiation of 
positive and negative emotions into more specific emotions such as joy, hope, anger, fear, and 
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sadness. Examples of such rules are that anger and sadness are elicited by an actual mismatch, 
whereas fear occurs in response to a pending mismatch (Arnold, 1960); that the events are more easy 
to cope with in the case of anger than in the cases of fear and sadness (Scherer, 1988); and that the 
mismatch in anger is caused by another person, preferably by someone who intended it (Lazarus, 
1991). Ultimately, the aim was to discover for each specific emotion a set of variables that is 
minimally (or typically) required to characterize its elicitors. Individual appraisal theorists vary with 
regard to the exact set of appraisal variables that they propose, but there is a fair degree of overlap. 
If it is true that stimuli elicit (specific) emotions when they have certain values for the 
proposed variables, it seems natural to assume that the organism must be able to assess these values. 
This has led appraisal theories to present the appraisal process as consisting of various components. 
Each component deals with a different variable or a different type of information. The component of 
goal relevance determines whether the stimulus is relevant or irrelevant for the person‘s goals. The 
component of goal conduciveness determines whether the stimulus constitutes a match or a mismatch 
with a goal. The component of presence determines whether the match or mismatch is pending or 
whether it already happened. The component of coping potential determines whether a person can 
prevent a pending mismatch, or undo the consequences of an actual mismatch. The components of 
agency and blame determine whether the source of an event is animate (self/other) or inanimate and 
whether the agent caused the event on purpose. Some authors (e.g., Scherer, 1984) have added to this 
list, the component of novelty (or unexpectedness) to account for the emotion surprise, and the 
component of intrinsic valence (i.e., the valence of a stimulus independent of current goals) to 
account for the emotion disgust. Some appraisal theorists view these components as sequential steps, 
with a separate process for each component (e.g., Scherer, 1984). Others view them as the 
constituents of one single process (Lazarus & C. A. Smith, 1988; C. A. Smith & Lazarus, 1990). In 
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sum, the observation that emotions depend on the interaction of various sources of information has 
led appraisal theorists to portray appraisal as a compositional process, one that is made up of various 
components. Stripped to the bone, a process that integrates information from a variety of sources is a 
constructive process (Ferguson & Bargh, 2003). Formally, a constructive process is one that operates 
on more than one input at the same time, short, a multiple-input process. I wish to note that, although 
I believe that constructiveness is central to appraisal theory, I do not regard it as a defining feature of 
appraisal. In line with current appraisal theoretical consensus, I leave room for appraisal that is non-
constructive (cf. See Fourth Strategy section). 
Appraisal theorists have insisted right from the start that the appraisal process can and often 
does proceed automatically (Arnold, 1960; Frijda, 1986, 1993; Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, 1984, 1993a; 
see also Kappas, 2006). This means that it can operate under suboptimal conditions such as when 
there is little time, little attentional capacity, subliminal stimulus input, and when there is no intention 
to engage in the process (see Box 1). The view that appraisal can be automatic accommodates the 
observation that emotions often arise automatically. It also dovetails with the idea that emotions are 
adaptive in that they are able to mobilize the organism in an automatic sense (e.g., in response to a 
life-threatening event). 
According to some appraisal theorists, appraisal is not only a necessary but also a sufficient 
cause of emotion (e.g., Lazarus, 1984). This claim needs to be qualified though. Consider the case in 
which a person appraises a stimulus as goal irrelevant and as a result, has no emotion. In this case, 
appraisal is present but an emotion is not; hence, appraisal is not sufficient for emotion. Two 
additional conditions are required. First, it is not the fact that a stimulus is appraised that makes it 
cause an emotion, but the fact that it is appraised as goal relevant. Thus, the presence or absence of an 
emotion is dependent on the content of appraisal (i.e., a specific value on the appraisal variable of 
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goal relevance). Second, the goal at stake must be highly important. In case of a low important goal, a 
state may be elicited that is not intense enough to qualify as a full-blown emotion (cf. Moors, 2007). 
In summary, the first contribution of appraisal theory was to argue that an appraisal process 
must mediate between a stimulus and an emotion to inform the organism which stimulus is eligible to 
elicit an emotion (an emotion per se or a specific emotion). The second contribution was a concrete 
proposal about which stimuli elicit emotions (emotions per se and specific emotions). This led to the 
characterization of the appraisal process as one that is often compositional or constructive. The 
appraisal process was further characterized as one that is often automatic. In short, appraisal theory 
has three central claims: (a) appraisal is a necessary cause of emotion, (b) appraisal is often 
constructive, and (c) appraisal is often automatic. 
Criticism 
Opponents of appraisal theory have struggled with appraisal theory‘s third claim, that 
appraisal is often automatic. This is part of the reason why some opponents have rejected the first 
claim, that appraisal is a necessary cause of emotion (i.e., that appraisal is the cause of all emotions). 
It is also the reason why some opponents have rejected the weaker version of that claim, that 
appraisal is a typical cause of emotion (i.e., that appraisal is the cause of most emotions). Below, I 
explain the relation between the rejection of the third claim and the rejection of the strong version 
(cf. 1) and the weak version (cf. 2) of the first claim. 
1. Critics have taken issue with the first claim, that appraisal is a necessary cause of emotion. 
They have adduced several empirical arguments to refute this claim (cf. Moors, 2007). One of these 
arguments rests on the assumption that appraisal cannot be automatic (i.e., a rejection of the third 
claim). Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc (1980) obtained an increase in liking for stimuli that were 
previously presented (i.e., mere exposure effect) even when these stimuli were not consciously 
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identified. This led Zajonc (1980) to conclude that liking of stimuli does not require prior cognitive 
processing. It may be noted that Zajonc talked about the relation between cognition and liking instead 
of the relation between appraisal and emotion. Nevertheless, Zajonc‘s position has been taken to 
challenge appraisal theory because appraisal is usually filed as a cognitive process (Lazarus, 1991; 
but see Kappas, 2006) and liking is sometimes seen as a minimal form of emotion (e.g., Barrett, 
2006; Zajonc, 1980; but see Leventhal & Scherer, 1987) or as a first step in the coming into being of 
an emotion (e.g., Scherer, 1984). Thus, Zajonc‘s position that liking does not require cognition has 
been reinterpreted as the position that emotion does not require appraisal. Importantly, Kunst-Wilson 
and Zajonc‘s finding of liking-without-consciousness can only be taken as evidence for 
liking/emotion-without-cognition/appraisal if cognition/appraisal is equated with conscious 
cognition/appraisal, which entails a rejection of the possibility of unconscious (i.e., automatic in the 
sense of unconscious) cognition/appraisal. Thus, one argument against appraisal theory‘s first claim 
(that appraisal is a necessary cause of emotion) is based on a rejection of appraisal theory‘s third 
claim (that appraisal can be automatic). Most contemporary researchers accept the possibility of 
unconscious cognition (and so did Zajonc in later writings, 1984, p. 118) and the liking-without-
consciousness argument is no longer considered a strong argument. However, the possibility of 
unconscious appraisal, at least the constructive type, is not equally broadly accepted (cf. See Second 
Strategy section). 
I briefly mention three other empirical arguments that researchers have adduced against 
appraisal theory‘s first claim. One argument comes from priming studies (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993) 
showing that emotional primes (happy versus scowling faces) produced shifts in liking ratings of 
neutral target stimuli (Chinese ideographs) when primes were presented subliminally (4 ms) but not 
supraliminally (1s), whereas cognitive features (e.g., gender, symmetry, and size) of the primes 
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spilled over to targets when primes were presented supraliminally (1s) but not subliminally (4 ms). 
Murphy and Zajonc (1993) concluded that emotional features of situations are processed prior to 
cognitive features and hence that cognition is not necessary for the processing of emotional features. 
Without going into a detailed analysis of this argument (cf. Clore, Storbeck, Robinson, & Centerbar, 
2005), it may be noted that the cognitive features in Murphy and Zajonc‘s research (symmetry, 
gender, and size) do not correspond to the cognitive features at issue in appraisal theory (e.g., goal 
relevance, goal conduciveness, and coping potential). A second argument are studies purporting to 
show that emotions can be directly triggered by physical stimulations coming from drugs or artificial 
posing of facial expressions (but for a critical review, see Niedenthal, Krauth-Grüber, & Ric, 2006). 
A third argument are neuro-anatomical findings showing that animals without a cortical brain are still 
capable of producing fear responses to previously conditioned stimuli (LeDoux, 1996). The latter 
argument rests on the assumption that appraisal cannot be subcortical (for more extensive discussions 
of the debate, see special issue, Cognition and Emotion, 6, 21, 2007). These additional arguments 
have led some appraisal theorists to weaken the first claim. Instead of arguing that appraisal is the 
cause of all emotions, they now argue that appraisal is the cause of most emotions and they are 
willing to accept the possibility that some marginal cases of emotional responses are not caused by 
appraisal (e.g., Frijda, 1993). 
2. Some critics of appraisal theory not only reject the strong claim that appraisal is the cause 
of all emotions, but also the weaker claim that appraisal is the cause of most emotions (e.g., 
Berkowitz & Harmon-Jones, 2004; Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999; LeDoux, 1996; Öhman & Wiens, 
2004). These critics have suggested that appraisal may be the cause of some, but certainly not of most 
emotions. In many cases, appraisals are consequences instead of causes of emotions. This view is 
based on the implicit or explicit assumption that appraisal is a rule-based process that operates on 
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propositional (i.e., verbal-like) representations and that is not likely to be automatic. Appraisal is 
accepted as a cause of emotions that occur under optimal conditions, but not of those that occur under 
suboptimal conditions. For example, Öhman and Wiens (2004) make a sharp distinction between a 
fast, automatic fear module and cognitive appraisal that is consciously accessible and occurs after the 
fact. They write that ―cognitive models of anxiety typically assume a linear series of appraisal stages 
from input to output, and that several of these stages are accessible in conscious awareness. Thus 
input from the environment is elaborated by appraisal processes to converge in consciousness, where 
options for action are evaluated and decisions to act are taken‖ (Öhman & Wiens, 2004, p. 71). Some 
critics of appraisal theory are ambiguous about the automaticity of appraisal. On some occasions, 
they accept the possibility of automatic appraisals (as a theoretical possibility). On other occasions, 
especially in summary statements of appraisal theory, they revert to the stereotype that appraisal is 
non-automatic (slow, laborious) and they depict the appraisal process as the scrolling down a verbal 
checklist. 
It is possible that some of these critics are simply misinformed about the fact that appraisal 
theory considers appraisal to be automatic (i.e., third claim). It is more likely, however, that they have 
genuine difficulty to reconcile the constructive character of appraisal (i.e., second claim) with its 
presumed automatic character (i.e., third claim). They find it unlikely that a process that integrates 
multiple sources of information can occur in the blink of an eye. To be fair, the idea of automatic 
constructive appraisal even sits uneasy with some appraisal theorists (e.g., those that take recourse to 
the first and second strategies discussed below). 
In summary, some critics of appraisal theory are opposed to the strong claim that appraisal is a 
necessary cause of emotion and some of them are also opposed to the weaker claim that appraisal is a 
typical cause of emotion. In both cases, at least part of the argumentation is based on the rejection or 
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denial of appraisal theory‘s other claim, that appraisal is an automatic process. Several critics tend to 
view the appraisal process with its various components as a process that is too complex to be 
automatic. And a process that is not automatic is not considered to be a plausible cause of emotions, 
at least not of those emotions that arise automatically. Appraisal theorists have picked up this 
criticism. For example, Smith and Kirby (2001, p. 128) wrote ―Critics of appraisal theory have 
tended to interpret the descriptions of complex and relational information involved in appraisal as 
implying that the process of appraisal is deliberate, slow, and verbally mediated. They then correctly 
note that such a process would fly in the face of common observations that emotions can be elicited 
very quickly, unbidden, often with a minimum of cognitive effort, and sometimes with little or no 
awareness of the nature of the emotion-eliciting stimulus.‖ Appraisal theorists have felt the urge to 
defend themselves against this criticism. In the next sections, I discuss two strategies that appraisal 
theorists have turned to in response to the accusation that appraisal is too complex to be automatic. 
After that, I propose and examine two alternative strategies. 
First Strategy 
A first strategy that some appraisal theorists have turned to is arguing that appraisal was never 
really meant as a cause of emotions but rather as a constituent of emotional experience. According to 
this view, appraisal is not a process but a description of the structure of emotional experience. A 
person may actually be angry because she is tired, but her anger feels as if there is a mismatch with 
her goals, and as if someone else is to blame for it. Ellsworth (2006) argued that it is as pointless to 
say that appraisal is a cause of emotions as it is to say that eggs and other ingredients are the cause of 
a cake.
1
 This view fits nicely with the idea expressed by some appraisal authors (e.g., Frijda, 1993; 
Scherer, 1993a) that the appraisals obtained with self-report measures do not reflect the causes of 
emotions but rather the structure of emotional experience. It should be noted that the role of appraisal 
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as a constituent of emotional experience is not in principle incompatible with the role of appraisal as 
a cause of emotions. Both roles can be regarded as two sides of a coin. If appraisal causes emotions, 
it is to be expected that part of these appraisals are reflected in emotional experience. 
Second Strategy 
A second strategy that appraisal theorists have turned to is arguing that appraisal is a causal 
process, but that appraisal theorists have provided a functional description of it and not an 
algorithmic one (cf., Reisenzein, 2001; Wehrle & Scherer, 2001; Roseman & C. A. Smith, 2001). 
The distinction between functional and algorithmic stems from a levels-of-analysis approach as 
proposed by Marr (1982). According to this approach, one process can be described at three levels of 
analysis. At the first or functional level, a process is described as a relation between input and output; 
it tells what the process does. For example, the process of adding numbers can be described as a 
relation between a pair of digits and their sum. At this level can also be situated the conditions under 
which the process operates (in addition to the stimulus input). Examples of conditions are the 
presence of ample time, abundant attentional capacity, a conscious input, and the intention to engage 
in the process. At the second or algorithmic level, a process is described in terms of the mechanisms 
that translate input into output. Examples are rule-based mechanisms and the associative mechanism. 
Digits can be added by counting the units of both digits (i.e., rule-based) or by directly retrieving the 
sum from memory (i.e., associative). This level also specifies the format of the representations or 
codes on which the mechanisms are thought to operate. Examples are propositional/symbolic (verbal-
like) codes and perceptual (image-like) codes. The third or implementational level is concerned with 
the physical realization of a process in the brain. It specifies the brain structures and circuits involved. 
The three levels are related, but only loosely. For example, one functional process can be explained 
by different underlying mechanisms, and one mechanism can explain different functional processes. 
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As mentioned, defenders of the second strategy hold that the appraisal process as it figures in most 
appraisal theories is a process described at the functional level. The appraisal process produces an 
emotion for some event, but no commitments are made with regard to the mechanism and codes 
responsible for producing this emotion or with regard to the neural circuits involved. 
Many appraisal theories can indeed be classified as functional theories that are only 
concerned with the relation between appraisal variables and emotions. A handful of appraisal theories 
have also ventured hypotheses about the algorithmic level (mechanisms and codes) and about the 
conditions under which appraisal can occur (which is strictly speaking a functional matter). A 
popular view is that there are (at least
2
) two modes of appraisal: one is rule based; the other is 
associative (Clore & Ortony, 2000; Leventhal & Scherer, 1987; C. A. Smith & Kirby, 2000, 2001; 
Teasdale, 1999; van Reekum & Scherer, 1997; for a review see E. R. Smith & Neumann, 2005).
3
 
Dual mode models of appraisal draw on dual mode models developed in other domains of 
psychology, such as social cognition (E. R. Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004) 
categorization (e.g., Rouder & Ratcliff, 2004), and reasoning (Sloman, 1996). In the rule-based 
mode, performance relies on a rule-based mechanism. That is, a mental rule is applied to an input (or 
a representation of the input) and computation of the rule produces an output. Producing the sum of a 
pair of digits by counting the units in both digits is an example of a rule-based mechanism. In the 
associative mode, performance is based on an associative mechanism. That is, an input activates 
stored representations of similar past inputs. This activation, in turn, spreads to associated stored 
representations that determine the output. Producing the sum of a pair of digits by retrieving it from 
memory is an example of an associative mechanism. The associative mechanism has sometimes been 
characterized as a pattern completion mechanism. Knowledge stored in memory is organized in 
schemata. The activation of one element in the schema activates the remaining information in the 
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schema. For example, the barking of a dog calls to mind a furry creature, that salivates, has a tail, and 
is called ―dog‖. A single stimulus can lead to the activation of an entire pattern of information. 
Applied to emotion elicitation, rule-based mechanisms are considered fit for the computation 
of appraisal values and integration of these values in a pattern. Once a stimulus has led to an 
appraisal pattern, the stimulus and its associated appraisal pattern can be stored in memory. The 
associative mechanism corresponds to the retrieval of a stored appraisal pattern and is triggered when 
the same or a similar stimulus is encountered (Clore & Ortony, 2000). It is important to note that 
activation of stored information by mere stimulus input is a single-input process. The constructive 
nature of appraisal is thus not preserved in the associative mode. 
The average dual mode model has the assumption that rule-based mechanisms operate on 
propositional/symbolic codes whereas the associative mechanism operates on perceptual codes (e.g., 
E. R. Smith & DeCoster, 2000). Another assumption is that the associative mechanism is automatic 
whereas rule-based mechanisms are non-automatic (or less automatic than the associative one; 
Cleeremans & Destrebecqz, 2005; Logan, 1988; Sloman, 1996; E. R Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack 
& Deutsch, 2004). For example, E. R Smith and DeCoster (2000) write that ―Associative retrieval 
[…] constitutes the effortless processing mode. The [rule-based] processing mode is more conscious 
and effortful; it involves the intentional retrieval of explicit, symbolically represented rules‖ (p. 108). 
Dual mode models of appraisal echo these assumptions. Appraisal in the rule-based mode is 
said to operate on propositional/symbolic codes and in a non-automatic way; appraisal in the 
associative mode is said to operate on perceptual codes (but see C. A. Smith & Kirby, 2001) and in 
an automatic way. When conditions are optimal, people use a rule-based mechanism to compute the 
output of individual appraisal components and integrate them in a pattern. For example, to compute 
goal conduciveness, they compare stimulus information (actual state) with motivational information 
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(desired state). A match between actual and desired state results in a positive emotion, a mismatch in 
a negative emotion. This information can further be integrated with information about coping 
potential and agency to determine whether anger or fear is to ensue. When conditions are suboptimal, 
however, people have to rely on memory recordings of previously computed appraisal patterns, 
which are activated on the basis of mere stimulus input. Thus, under suboptimal conditions, the 
flexibility that comes with constructive processing in the rule-based mode is lost (cf. Clore & Ortony, 
2000; C. A. Smith & Kirby, 2001). Suppose that a person is hungry and is served chocolate cake. 
Dual mode theorists would say that under optimal conditions, a person compares the chocolate cake 
with her motivational state, which results in the output that the cake is goal conducive and hence 
positive (or to-be-approached). An association is then formed in memory between the representation 
of the chocolate cake and the representation of positive valence. On a later occasion, when conditions 
are suboptimal, the person has not choice but to rely on this stored valence. This valence is 
appropriate when the person is in the motivational state in which the association was originally 
formed (hungry), but inappropriate when she is in a different motivational state (satiated). In other 
words, the flexibility that appraisal theory set out to explain is lost under suboptimal conditions. As 
Clore and Ortony (2000) put it, each mode of appraisal carries benefits and costs. The associative 
mechanism is fast and automatic but relatively inflexible and more error prone. The rule-based 
mechanism takes more time but allows greater flexibility. 
It is interesting to note that many dual (or multi) mode theorists have argued that appraisal in the 
associative mode is the royal road to emotion elicitation (Leventhal & Scherer, 1987; C. A. Smith & 
Kirby, 2001; Teasdale, 1999). For example, Leventhal and Scherer (1987) argued that emotions are 
preferably elicited by appraisal in the schematic mode (which is their term for the associative mode). 
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Appraisal in the conceptual mode (which is their term for the rule-based mode) can only elicit 
emotions indirectly by ―calling up‖ the schematic mode. 
To sum up, dual (or multi) mode theorists of appraisal and many critics of appraisal theory 
share the assumption that emotions can be elicited by mechanisms of (at least) two kinds: associative 
and rule-based. Dual mode theorists of appraisal use the term appraisal to cover both mechanisms 
whereas their critics reserve it for the rule-based variant. Thus, dual mode theorists of appraisal have 
a broader view of appraisal than their critics. However, dual mode theorists of appraisal seem to 
agree with their critics (a) that constructive appraisal asks for a rule-based mechanism, and (b) that 
rule-based mechanisms are usually non-automatic. This means that under suboptimal conditions, the 
constructive nature of appraisal and the flexibility that comes with it are lost. I present and examine 
two alternative strategies (the third and the fourth strategy) that attempt to preserve the constructive 
flavor of appraisal even under suboptimal conditions. The third strategy argues against ―(b)‖. The 
fourth strategy builds on a rejection of ―(a)‖. 
Third Strategy 
Appraisal theorists who adopt the second strategy and accept a dual mode model make the a 
priori assumption that rule-based appraisal is likely to occur under optimal conditions and is replaced 
with stimulus-based memory retrieval under suboptimal conditions. A third strategy might be to 
question this a priori assumption and to investigate empirically whether rule-based appraisal can 
operate under suboptimal conditions (i.e., be automatic). Empirical research concerned with the 
automaticity of rule-based processes faces at least two problems. One is that automaticity is a gradual 
notion and not a matter of all or nothing (Bargh, 1992). This complicates the diagnosis of automatic 
vs. non-automatic processes One solution is to specify the features of automaticity that apply and to 
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make only relative conclusions for each feature, thereby choosing a standard for comparison or a 
subjective criterion (cf. second part of Box 1). 
A more difficult problem is that there is no satisfactory criterion to distinguish the associative 
mechanism from rule-based ones (cf. discussions in Hahn & Chater, 1998; Moors & De Houwer, 
2006b). In Box 2, I discuss three proposals for how to draw the line between the associative 
mechanism and rule-based ones: expressability in an IF-THEN format, abstract vs. non-abstract 
representations, and perfect vs. partial matching. The research literature contains several other 
proposals for how to distinguish rule-based mechanisms from associative ones, but none seems 
unequivocal. There are at least three options that one can turn to in response to this problem. A first 
option is to continue the search for a distinction between rule-based and associative mechanisms that 
does lead to an unequivocal empirical test. A second option is to endorse a gradual view of this 
distinction (e.g., Pothos, 2005) and to make relative conclusions or to specify a subjective criterion 
for calling some mechanism rule-based or associative. A third option is to abandon the search for a 
distinction between rule-based and associative mechanisms and to stick to the functional level of 
process description. It is the third option that I resort to in the present paper (see Fourth Strategy 
section). It is important to note that process descriptions at the functional level can be couched in 
more concrete terms (specifying the concrete content of input and output) or in more abstract terms 
(specifying the content of input and output on a more abstract level, or specifying only the structure 
of input and output). Thus, researchers who confine themselves to the functional level can focus on 
abstract descriptions of processes and in this way continue the search for regularities. 
Fourth Strategy 
In the section about the second strategy, I argued that critics of appraisal theory as well as 
dual mode theorists of appraisal find it unlikely that constructive appraisal proceeds automatically 
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and acts as a cause of most emotions. According to my analysis, this is due to the underlying 
assumptions (a) that the constructive nature of appraisal necessitates a rule-based mechanism, and 
(b) that rule-based mechanisms are non-automatic. In the previous section, I argued that it is difficult 
to disprove ―(b)‖ because of the difficulty to distinguish between the associative mechanism and rule-
based ones. In the present section, I take on a different path, which consists in arguing against ―(a)‖. 
I stated that one of the major contributions of appraisal theory was to emphasize the variable 
relation between stimuli and emotions and to formulate concrete rules about which variables are 
crucial in predicting whether an emotion will follow (and which one). To guarantee that emotions are 
elicited according to these rules, the process mediating between stimuli and emotions must be able to 
assess the values on these variables. If emotions are indeed elicited by constellations of stimuli and 
goals (and other information) rather than by stimuli alone, then the mediating process should be able 
to determine the nature of the constellation and not simply the nature of the stimulus. Chocolate cake 
can make a person happy when she is hungry but disgusted when she has just eaten five pieces of it. 
Before an emotion of happiness or disgust can arise, information about the stimulus must be 
combined with information about the person‘s motivational state. This led to the characterization of 
appraisal as a process that is often constructive, one with multiple inputs (minimally two: a stimulus 
and a goal). 
The characterization of a process as constructive can be regarded as a characterization at the 
abstract functional level. The number of inputs entering a process is clearly a functional matter 
(because the functional level is about inputs and outputs). It is also abstract because it specifies the 
structure and not the content of the input. 
Various mechanisms at the algorithmic level may be compatible with the functional 
requirement of handling multiple inputs. Rule-based mechanisms are well suited for the constructive 
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task to integrate multiple inputs. But a constructive process does not have to be rule-based. A 
constructive process can also be associative. Examples of constructive associative processes are the 
multiple-input retrieval processes that can be found in occasion setting literature (Davidson, 1998), 
situated cognition models (E. R. Smith & Zaraté, 1992), and connectionist or dynamic systems 
models
4
 (Barrett, Ochsner, & Gross, 2007; Lewis, 2005). 
In occasion setting, an occasion setter is conceived of as a node that modulates the relation 
between the memory representations of a conditioned stimulus (CS) and an unconditioned stimulus 
(US). For example, the motivational state hunger may be conceived of as an occasion setter, a food 
stimulus as the CS, and the positive postingestional consequences of food intake as the US. The CS 
entertains both an excitatory and an inhibitory link with the US that cancel each other out when the 
organism is not hungry. When the organism is hungry, the occasion setter is active and exerts an 
inhibitory influence on the inhibitory link between CS and US. As a result, only the excitatory 
relation between CS and US remains, and the food stimulus leads to a positive evaluation. The 
process described is constructive because it combines two types of information (stimulus and 
goal/motivational state), yet it is purely associative (there is no computation, only activation of 
memory traces). 
Situated cognition models (Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005; 
E. R. Smith & Zaraté, 1992) assume that context information shapes the kind of stimulus information 
that is activated in memory. For example, memory does not have a single representation for the 
concept dog, but many, one for each context in which dogs can be encountered. The presence of a 
dog in a particular context activates the specific dog representation that matches the context. In E. R. 
Smith and Zaraté‘s (1992) exemplar-based model of social judgment, exemplars are first categorized 
according to their similarity with stored exemplars and then adopt the valence tag associated with the 
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category. A critical assumption in this model is that motivational and other context factors determine 
which stimulus dimension is selected as the basis for similarity with stored exemplars and hence 
categorization. For example, a young cook can be categorized according to his/her age or according 
to his/her profession. Situated cognition models have also been applied to emotion. Barrett (2006), 
for example, argued that people do not have just one representation (or schema) for anger, but one for 
each context in which anger can occur. For example, anger on the highway is different from anger in 
a waiting cue. The process at stake in situated cognition models is constructive because it combines 
two types of information (stimulus and context), yet it is purely associative (no computation, only 
retrieval). 
Connectionist models rest on the metaphor of the mind as a network of associations. Some 
older models are localist (with one node for each representation), but most modern ones are 
distributed (concepts are represented subsymbolically by a pattern of activation that is distributed 
among many nodes). The only mechanism allowed in these models is associative. Processing comes 
down to the activation of patterns of associations. A typical feature of connectionist networks is that 
they have multiple entry points that are activated simultaneously. The associative process in 
connectionists models is thus constructive. Because connectionist models only have room for the 
associative mechanism, they count as unimode models and offer an alternative to classic models such 
as dual mode models (e.g., Sloman, 1996) and unimode models that favor only rule-based 
mechanisms (e.g., Kruglanski, Erb, Pierro, Mannetti, & Chun, 2006). The idea that connectionist 
models are incompatible with classic ones has led so-called eliminativists to propose that classic 
models should be eliminated and replaced by connectionist ones. So-called implementationalists, on 
the other hand, argue that classic models and connectionist ones do not address the same level of 
process understanding (the algorithmic level) and thus are not in principle incompatible. Instead, they 
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view connectionist models as a step toward the implementation of classic models. According to them, 
connectionist models have the power to bridge the gap between the algorithmic and the 
implementational level. 
I suggest that the crucial contrast is no longer between rule-based processes and associative 
ones but between constructive (i.e., multiple-input) processes and non-constructive (i.e., single input) 
ones. As mentioned earlier, dual mode theorists of appraisal tend to map constructive processes to 
rule-based ones, and non-constructive processes to associative ones. I pointed out that constructive 
processes can be rule-based as well as associative. I agree with dual mode theorists of appraisal that 
appraisal does not necessarily ask for a rule-based process, but this does not force us to accept a non-
constructive associative process as the only alternative. Appraisal theory may not be dedicated to 
rule-based processing, but I believe it is dedicated to constructive processing. As explained earlier, a 
non-constructive process cannot deliver the same flexibility as a constructive process can. By 
suggesting that constructive appraisal can occur under optimal conditions but is replaced by non-
constructive retrieval under suboptimal conditions, dual mode theorists of appraisal accept that 
flexibility is lost under suboptimal conditions. I consider this to be a weakening of appraisal theory 
and propose a fourth strategy to respond to the criticism. 
The fourth strategy is to investigate the automatic nature of constructive (instead of rule-
based) processes involved in appraisal. This strategy eludes the difficulty to distinguish between the 
associative mechanism and rule-based ones, yet it preserves the core of appraisal theory. Rather than 
assuming a priori that complexity and automaticity do not go together, it should be determined 
empirically how much complexity can be handled in suboptimal conditions, and thus how much 
flexibility is possible. 
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In line with defenders of the second strategy, I define appraisal on the functional level of 
process description. Appraisal is a process that produces an evaluation of the stimulus along one or 
more variables proposed in appraisal theories, such as goal relevance, goal conduciveness, intrinsic 
valence, coping potential, and agency. Defining appraisal on the functional level entails that there are 
no a priori assumptions about the conditions under which it occurs (optimal vs. suboptimal), the 
underlying mechanisms (associative vs. rule-based), or the format of the representations on which it 
operates or that it produces (propositional vs. perceptual). This definition of appraisal is broad 
because it covers a wide range of mechanisms and codes. It is not all-inclusive, however, because it 
excludes processes that deliver a value for variables other than appraisal variables. Processes that 
deal with location, color, gender, and other non-affective semantic categories do not fall within the 
boundaries of the concept of appraisal. 
I distinguish between two types of appraisal: one type is constructive (multiple-input); the 
other is non-constructive (single-input). Even though I claim that emphasis on constructive appraisal 
is one of the unique contributions of appraisal theory, I leave room for appraisal that is not 
constructive. Some individual appraisal variables require a constructive process, whereas others do 
not. Constructive processes are plausibly involved in the appraisal variables of goal relevance, goal 
conduciveness, and expectancy or novelty. Determining whether a stimulus is goal relevant or goal 
conducive (cf. example above) seems to require a comparison between two inputs: the stimulus (i.e., 
actual state) and a goal (i.e., desired state).
5
 A comparison seems also required to determine whether 
a stimulus (i.e., actual state) conforms to one‘s expectations (i.e., expected state). A constructive 
process seems less crucial for other appraisal variables such as intrinsic valence. Indeed, to determine 
the valence of a stimulus independent of current goals or other aspects of the context, a single-input 
retrieval process seems sufficient. Still other appraisal components such as coping potential and 
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agency/blame may ask for a constructive process on some occasions but a non-constructive one on 
others. To determine whether one can cope with a negative event often requires a comparison of 
one‘s actual power with the power required to prevent or overcome the event. There may be cases, 
however, in which coping potential can be determined on the basis of a single cue (e.g., some 
negative events can never be undone). A constructive process may not be necessary to determine the 
agent that caused a stimulus in case there is only one potential agent. In case there are more, 
however, agent and event must be linked in some way and this may ask for a constructive process. 
For theorists who view the appraisal process as a sequence of steps in which each step 
produces a value for a single appraisal variable (e.g., Scherer, 1984), the processes involved in these 
steps are completed one after the other and the emotion becomes more specific with each step. Some 
steps may require a constructive process whereas others may not. For theorists who view the 
appraisal process as a single process (e.g., C. A. Smith & Lazarus, 1990), the various appraisal 
variables constitute various sources of information that must be combined into a single pattern. This 
pattern determines the nature of the ensuing emotion. Here, the entire appraisal process is 
constructive. In sum, constructive processes may be involved in individual appraisal variables as well 
as in the integration of appraisal values into a pattern. In the next section, I discuss experiments that 
were set up in our lab to investigate the automaticity of constructive appraisals. 
Investigating the Automaticity of Constructive Appraisals 
To demonstrate that constructive appraisal can be automatic, investigators should elicit 
responses (effects) and demonstrate that these are based on automatic constructive appraisal. This 
entails demonstrating that the underlying process: (a) can be automatic, (b) is constructive, and 
(c) qualifies as appraisal. 
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(a) The degree to which a process is automatic can be diagnosed by looking at the degree to 
which one or more features of automaticity apply, such as fast, uncontrolled in the promoting sense 
(i.e., unintentional), uncontrolled in the counteracting sense, unconscious, and efficient. This amounts 
to investigating the conditions under which the process operates. In line with the gradual view that 
my colleagues and I endorse, we consider the evidence for individual features separately, and do not 
infer the presence of one feature (e.g., unintentional) on the basis of the presence of another (e.g., 
fast) (Bargh, 1992; Moors & De Houwer, 2006a). To investigate the automaticity of constructive 
appraisals, we used variants of the affective priming task (Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992; 
Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986; Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 1994). Before going 
into the details of our experiments, I briefly describe the standard affective priming task and explain 
why this task is suitable for the diagnosis of automaticity features. 
In a standard affective priming task (See Figure 1), participants are shown a series of trials. 
Each trial consists in the brief presentation of a positive or negative prime stimulus, rapidly followed 
by the presentation of a positive or negative target stimulus. On half of the trials, called congruent 
trials, the valence of prime and target is the same (positive-positive or negative-negative). On the 
other half of the trials, called incongruent trials, the valence of prime and target is opposite (positive-
negative or negative-positive). Participants are asked to respond to the targets as quickly as possible 
by evaluating them as positive or negative. A congruency effect is found when responses are faster 
and/or more often correct on congruent than on incongruent trials. The observation of a congruency 
effect indicates that the valence of the primes influenced processing of and responding to the targets. 
This in turn indicates that prime valence was processed under the conditions created by the 
experiment. An analysis of these conditions is informative about the features of automaticity that 
apply to the process of evaluating the primes (cf. Moors, Spruyt, & De Houwer, in press). The short 
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interval between the onsets of primes and targets (stimulus onset asynchrony, SOA) combined with 
the short response times to the targets shows that evaluation of the primes can be rapid. Because 
prime valence is irrelevant for the task to respond to the targets, participants are not encouraged to 
pursue the intention to process prime valence. This aspect of the procedure supports the hypothesis 
that prime valence can be processed unintentionally, or at least, without the participants‘ conscious 
intention. Another strategy that researchers have used to discourage participants from focusing on the 
valence of the primes is to replace the evaluative target task with a non-evaluative task such as a 
lexical decision task (Wentura, 2000) or a naming task (e.g., Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond, & Hymes, 
1996; Spruyt & Hermans, 2008). When participants do not focus on valence in general, they are also 
less likely to be focus on prime valence in particular. It is even likely that participants in priming 
tasks pursue the goal to avoid processing prime valence rather than to engage in processing it. They 
may experience that processing the valence of the primes interferes with the task of responding to the 
targets. If participants indeed have the goal to avoid evaluating the primes, the fact that they do 
evaluate them demonstrates that this process can be uncontrolled in the counteracting sense. Support 
that the process of evaluating the primes can be efficient comes from affective priming studies in 
which a secondary task, simultaneously performed with the priming task, did not reduce the strength 
of the congruency effect (Hermans, Crombez, & Eelen, 2000). Finally, congruency effects have been 
observed when primes were presented subliminally (e.g., Draine & Greenwald, 1998; Klinger, 
Burton, & Pitts, 2000), which shows that evaluation of the primes can be triggered on the basis of 
unconscious input. 
_________________________________ 
Please insert Figure 1 about here 
___________________________________ 
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(b) In standard affective priming studies, the prime stimuli are isolated words or pictures for 
which participants most likely have a fixed valence stored in memory. In order to process the valence 
of a prime, participants only have to activate the memory trace leading to the representation of the 
prime and its associated valence tag. Activation of this memory trace only requires a single input: the 
prime stimulus. These studies therefore provide no evidence for the possibility that constructive 
processes can be automatic. To test this possibility, we specifically designed two sets of studies. In 
one set, we investigated whether the constructive comparison process involved in the appraisal of 
goal conduciveness can be automatic. In another set, we investigated whether the constructive 
process required for integrating information about valence and coping potential can be automatic. 
(c) To show that priming effects rely on automatic constructive appraisal not only requires 
showing that the processes underlying these effects are automatic and constructive, but also that they 
qualify as appraisal. Based on my functional definition of appraisal as evaluation of a stimulus on 
variables proposed in appraisal theories, constructive appraisals can be delineated from other 
constructive processes on the basis of the variables involved. In the first set of studies we 
manipulated the goal conduciveness of the stimuli. In the second set of studies, we manipulated the 
intrinsic valence or goal conduciveness of the stimuli and the coping potential of the participants. The 
variables goal conduciveness, intrinsic valence, and coping potential are explicitly proposed in most 
appraisal theories. It can thus be confirmed that in both sets of studies, the constructive processes that 
we manipulated qualified as appraisal. I describe both sets of studies in turn. 
Automatic Integration of Stimuli and Goals? 
In a first experiment (Moors & De Houwer, 2001, see Figure 2), participants received a series 
of trials and each trial consisted of two phases: a goal-inducing phase and a priming phase. In the 
goal-inducing phase, a game rule stipulated that one color (e.g., yellow) would be rewarded during 
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that trial (10 points) and another color (e.g., blue) would not. Participants then played a game in 
which they tried to produce the rewarded color: The letters Y (referring to yellow) and B (referring to 
blue) appeared on screen in quick alternating succession and participants tried to press a key at the 
exact moment at which the letter of the rewarded color was on screen. In the priming phase, a yellow 
or blue stimulus (series of Xs) was presented as the prime and participants were told that the color of 
the prime corresponded to the letter that they had hit during the goal-inducing phase.
6
 In this way, the 
prime conveyed feedback about the participants‘ performance of the game. The prime stimulus was 
goal conducive or had a positive motivational valence
7
 when it was in the rewarded color; it was goal 
inconducive or had a negative motivational valence when it was in the non-rewarded color. For 
example, when yellow was rewarded, a yellow prime was positive and a blue prime was negative. 
Importantly, the rewarded color and the prime color varied randomly across trials. Thus, participants 
could not store for each color a valence tag that was valid throughout the experiment. To determine 
the valence of the primes, participants could not rely on stimulus-based memory retrieval, but had to 
compare the rewarded color (desired state) with the prime color (actual state). The prime was 
presented very briefly (200 ms) and was immediately (after 100 ms) followed by a positive or 
negative target word. Participants had to evaluate the targets as quickly as possible. We obtained 
congruency effects, with faster responses and less errors when prime and target valence were the 
same than when they were opposite. Such congruency effects indicate that the constructive process 
necessary to determine the prime valence can occur under the conditions created by the experiment. 
These conditions argue for the relative automaticity of this process, in the sense of fast and 
unintentional. The short SOAs between prime and target combined with the short response times to 
the targets show that the critical process of evaluating the primes occurred rapidly. The fact that the 
prime valence was irrelevant for the task to respond to the targets as quickly as possible during the 
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priming phase of each trial supports the idea that evaluation of the primes occurred without the 
(conscious) intention to do so. 
The latter argument cannot be considered conclusive, however. The participants in our studies 
may have been encouraged to intentionally process the prime valence because it informed them about 
their performance on the goal-inducing task. This issue was examined further in two studies (Moors, 
De Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 2005). In one study, we obtained priming effects when feedback 
about the goal-inducing task (the prime) was presented a second time (1500 ms) after the target 
response was given. This was done to discourage participants from focusing on the primes. Priming 
effects were also obtained in another study, in which participants were forced to respond within 600 
ms after target onset. In case participants would still have the conscious intention to process prime 
valence, implementation of this intention was made very difficult. In addition, priming effects did not 
differ between participants who did and those who did not report having focused on the valence of 
the primes. 
________________________________ 
Please insert Figure 2 about here 
__________________________________ 
In another series of subsequent studies (Moors, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2004), we investigated 
further whether a constructive process was really required to determine the valence of the primes. In 
the experiments described above, participants could not rely on a fixed stored valence tag for each 
color because the rewarded color and the prime color were randomly varied across trials. We 
concluded that participants had to compare the rewarded color and the prime color each time a prime 
was presented. According to an alternative explanation, however, it is possible that participants 
conducted the crucial comparison prior to prime presentation immediately after the game rule was 
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presented. The result of this comparison could have been stored in memory and subsequently 
retrieved upon prime presentation. Hence, a single-input retrieval process could have sufficed to 
determine the valence of the primes. The next study (Moors et al., 2004, Experiment 1) was set up to 
test this alternative explanation. This study was similar to the first experiment described above except 
that the game rules stipulated that either an animal or a profession would yield ten points, the 
alternating letters were A (indicating animal) and P (indicating profession), and primes were animal 
exemplars (e.g., LIZARD) or profession exemplars (e.g., SURGEON) randomly picked from a list of 
40 non-stereotypic exemplars. In this experiment, we thought it not very likely that participants 
would generate all exemplars from both categories and tag them as positive or negative prior to prime 
presentation. Nevertheless, congruency effects were obtained. 
According to an alternative explanation for this finding, however, participants did not tag 
each exemplar as positive or negative prior to prime presentation, but rather the entire categories of 
animal and profession. A subsequently presented prime exemplar merely had to be assigned to its 
category before inheriting the category‘s valence tag. According to this explanation, the valence of 
the primes was determined by the processes of categorization and retrieval instead of a constructive 
comparison process. To test this explanation, we conducted an experiment (Moors et al., 2004, 
Experiment 2) that was similar to the previous one, except that now two types of trials were presented 
intermixed: On one third of the trials, a category label (ANIMAL or PROFESSION) was presented as 
the prime. The participants were told that category label primes yielded a reversed feedback of their 
performance on the goal-inducing task. For example, when animal was rewarded, the prime 
ANIMAL indicated failure instead of success, whereas the prime PROFESSION indicated success 
instead of failure. On the remaining two thirds of the trials, exemplars were presented as primes and 
feedback was normal as in the previous experiments. We obtained a congruency effect for the 
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exemplar primes but not for the category label primes. This result is more in line with an explanation 
that prime valence was determined by a comparison process than with an explanation that category 
labels were tagged with positive or negative valence prior to prime presentation and that primes 
inherited this valence upon prime presentation. If participants would have tagged the categories of 
animal and profession prior to prime presentation, we would have expected a congruency effect to 
occur also for the trials with ANIMAL and PROFESSION as primes. 
In the next experiment (Moors et al., 2004, Experiment 3), we obtained support against 
another alternative explanation. According to this explanation, the crucial comparison took place 
immediately after presentation of the game rule, and the valence resulting from this comparison 
spread to the exemplars of each category in an unconscious manner. This valence could be retrieved 
upon the subsequent presentation of the prime. The experiment was identical to the one in which only 
exemplar trials occurred (Moors et al., 2004, Experiment 1), except that now primes were either 
stereotypic or non-stereotypic exemplars of animals and professions. If some kind of spreading of 
valence mechanism would indeed be operative, one may expect that, given certain assumptions, 
stereotypic exemplars would be more likely to receive valence than non-stereotypic ones. As a 
consequence, one may expect a stronger congruency effect for trials with stereotypic primes than for 
trials with non-stereotypic primes. The results of this experiment, however, showed equally strong 
congruency effects for both types of trials. This result further corroborates the hypothesis that prime 
valence was determined by a comparison process instead of a single-input retrieval process. 
To summarize, I described a variant of the affective priming task designed to investigate 
whether the constructive comparison process involved in the appraisal of goal conduciveness (or 
motivational valence, as we called it) can be automatic. The congruency effects obtained with this 
experiment were further examined in two series of subsequent studies. In the first series, we obtained 
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further support for the automaticity of this effect. The second series corroborated that prime valence 
was determined by a constructive comparison process instead of by a single-input retrieval process. 
In the next section, I focus on the constructive process involved in integrating valence information 
with coping information. I describe one study that constitutes a first step in what should become a 
more elaborate set of studies. 
Automatic Integration of Valence with Coping Potential? 
We conducted a variant of the affective priming task in which each trial consisted in a game 
phase and a priming phase. During the game phase, participants played a very simple Pac-Man game. 
They walked a Pac-Man through a maze eating pellets (thereby earning points) until a ghost (which is 
negative or goal inconducive) suddenly popped up close to the Pac-Man. Together with the ghost, 
either a wall appeared or no wall appeared. In case a wall appeared, the Pac-Man was trapped and 
coping potential was low. In case no wall appeared, the Pac-Man could flee and coping potential was 
high. The image of the ghost with or without a wall constituted the prime. We assumed that 
integration of a negative stimulus (the ghost) with low coping potential (being trapped) would result 
in negative prime valence, whereas integration of a negative stimulus with high coping potential 
would result in positive prime valence. Each prime was immediately (after 300 ms) followed by a 
positive or negative target word which appeared in the centre of the maze. Participants had to 
evaluate the target as quickly as possible before they could flee (in high coping trials) or before they 
were destroyed (in low coping trials). We obtained a congruency effect, F(1,31) = 5.68, p < .05, with 
faster responses to trials on which prime and target had the same valence (M = 906) compared to 
trials on which they had an opposite valence (M = 928). 
This result suggests that the constructive process of integrating information about valence and 
coping potential can take place automatically in the sense of fast and without conscious intentions. As 
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in the former set of studies, it should be investigated further whether a constructive process was 
really required to determine the valence of the primes. It remains possible that participants engaged in 
the integration of negative information with coping information early on in the experiment and that 
they attached a negative valence in memory to the stimulus ―wall‖ and a positive valence to the 
stimulus ―no wall‖. If this was indeed the case, the prime valence could have been determined by 
retrieval of these valence tags. The results of this experiment therefore do not provide conclusive 
evidence that coping information and valence information can be automatically integrated. 
The two sets of studies described above are a first step toward examining the amount of 
complexity and integration that is possible in a short amount of time and when participants are asked 
to concentrate on another stimulus or variable than the critical one. Our studies show that some 
constructive appraisals can take place under these conditions, and hence that they are candidate 
causes of emotions that appear under these conditions. In the next section, I spend a few lines on 
research concerned with the automatic processing of individual appraisal variables, irrespective of 
whether they are based on a constructive process or on single-input retrieval. These studies are 
relevant for the issue of automatic constructive appraisal because only if individual appraisal 
components can be automatic is there a possibility that (further) integration of them can be automatic 
as well. After that, I compare our findings with findings showing the automaticity of constructive 
processes outside the domain of emotion. These studies can inform us about the general level of 
complexity that can be dealt with under suboptimal conditions. 
Support for Automaticity of Appraisal Components Irrespective of Underlying Process 
Diverse research traditions provide useful information about the automatic processing of 
appraisal variables such as goal conduciveness, intrinsic valence, coping potential, agency/blame, 
goal relevance, and novelty. The first set of studies discussed above supports the automaticity of goal 
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conduciveness appraisal. The experiment described in the second set was designed to find support for 
the automatic integration of intrinsic valence and coping potential. To the extent that the effect 
obtained in this experiment was indeed based on the integration of both appraisal variables, it also 
provides support for the automatic processing of the individual appraisal variables of intrinsic 
valence and coping potential. The automatic processing of intrinsic stimulus valence is further amply 
documented in the standard affective priming research discussed above (Bargh et al., 1992; Fazio et 
al., 1986; Hermans et al., 1994) as well as in studies using ERP method (Grandjean & Scherer, 2008; 
Righart & De Gelder, 2005). 
In recent studies (Moors & De Houwer, 2005), we found that participants can automatically 
determine the relative status or power of a target person in pictures of social interactions in which one 
person is dominant and the other is submissive. In several appraisal theories, relative power is 
considered an important ingredient of the appraisal component of coping potential (e.g., Scherer, 
1988). ―In the case of an obstructive event brought about by a conspecific aggressor or predator, the 
comparison between the organism‘s estimate of its own power and the agent‘s perceived power is 
likely to decide between anger and fear and thus between fight and flight‖ (Ellsworth & Scherer, 
2003, p. 580). There is reason to assume that determining one‘s relative status is based on a 
comparison between one‘s own status and that of the interaction partner (i.e., a constructive process). 
This being said, it is possible that participants relied on learnt cues (e.g., an angry expression) to 
determine the status of the target person. 
Support for the automatic detection of goal relevance comes from studies using attentional 
bias tasks (e.g., the modified Stroop task, the dot probe task, the spatial cueing task, and the visual 
search task) demonstrating selective attention to goal-relevant compared to neutral stimuli (see 
Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996). The finding that goal-relevant stimuli exerted an influence 
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on attention indicates that goal relevance was processed under the conditions created by the 
experiment. These conditions provide information about the automaticity features that apply to this 
processing. For example, attentional bias effects obtained using a dot probe task with subliminal cue 
presentation support the idea that goal relevance can be processed automatically, in the sense of 
based on unconscious input (e.g., Mogg, Bradley, & Williams, 1995). There is disagreement about 
whether goals are necessary for attention orienting. Some researchers have argued that attention 
orienting may also be triggered by novelty (Gati & Ben-Shakar, 1990; Sokolov, 1963; but see 
Bernstein, 1969). Further support for automatic appraisal of novelty comes from neuroscientific 
studies (e.g., Berns, Cohen, & Mintun, 1997). 
There is also evidence that the appraisal component of agency/blame can be automatic. With 
regard to blame, recent studies show that people automatically attribute intentionality when seeing or 
reading about other people‘s actions (e.g., Dik & Aarts, in press; Hassin, Aarts, & Ferguson, 2005). 
Moreover, given certain characteristics of movements, people even spontaneously attribute 
intentionality to non-living entities (see review by Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000). 
Neuroscientific studies sometimes provide indirect support for automatic appraisal. The 
amygdala is a structure that is strongly associated with automaticity. It can be activated by features 
that are not consciously perceived and in the absence of intention (e.g., Whalen et al., 1998; although 
note that some studies have shown that amygdala activation can to a certain extent be controlled, 
Cunningham, Van Bavel, & Johnsen, 2008; Ochsner et al., 2004). The consensual view is that the 
amygdala detects threatening information (e.g., Öhman & Wiens, 2004), or that it detects negative 
information in general (i.e. appraisal of intrinsic valence, Hariri, Tessitore, Mattay, Fera, & 
Weinberger, 2002). Alternative views include that it is a novelty or unexpectedness detector 
(signaling mismatches between actual and expected states; e.g., Schwartz et al., 2003) and that it is a 
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goal relevance detector (signaling matches or mismatches between actual and desired states, e.g., 
Sander, Grafman, & Zalla, 2003). It is difficult to keep apart novelty and goal relevance because 
novel stimuli can be viewed as potentially goal-relevant (Bernstein & Taylor, 1979). Automaticity is 
not restricted to subcortical structures. An example of a cortical structure that seems relevant for the 
question of automatic appraisal is the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). Detecting goal conduciveness 
seems to have at least structural resemblance with conflict detection processes that are typically 
situated in the ACC (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001). ERP studies show that 
conflict detection has both unaware (i.e., ne/ERN) and aware (i.e., pe) components (Nieuwenhuis, 
Ridderinkhof, Blom, Band, & Kok, 2001). 
Support for Automaticity of Constructive Processes Outside the Domain of Emotion 
In the first set of studies discussed above, we examined the influence of goals on stimulus 
evaluation. In the second set, we examined the influence of coping options on stimulus evaluation. 
These influences can be regarded as specific kinds of context effects (cf. Frijda, 2007). Indeed, the 
motivational context and the coping context are specific kinds of contexts and stimulus evaluation is 
a specific kind of process. It may be instructive to compare our findings with findings about the 
automaticity of context effects outside the domain of emotion. Context effects appear to be non-
automatic in some studies, but automatic in others. For example, Marcel (1982) found that 
polysemous words were disambiguated by supraliminal context words only when the words were 
presented supraliminally, but not when they were presented subliminally, suggesting that subliminal 
word processing is not constrained by supraliminal context. In many other studies, however, context 
effects are automatic in one or more senses. I mention a few examples. A well-established finding in 
perception research is that the perceived color (e.g., green vs. yellow) of an object varies with the 
color of the surrounding objects (e.g., reddish vs. bluish; Purves & Lotto, 2002). This effect is fast, 
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compelling (i.e., uncontrolled in the promoting and the counteracting sense), and probably efficient. 
The same can be said about perceptual illusions such as the Müller-Lyer illusion, where the perceived 
length of a line depends on the orientation of the surrounding angles (>--< vs. <-->). Van Opstal, 
Moors, Fias, and Verguts (2008) showed that classification of a number (e.g., 4) as small or large is 
dependent of the range of the numbers in the stimulus set (e.g., 1-4 or 4-8). This effect even occurred 
when the target numbers were presented subliminally. 
Conclusion 
Both critics and some defenders of appraisal theory seem to struggle with a tension between 
the claim that appraisal is a process that causes emotions, and the proposal that appraisal is 
constructive, in the sense that it integrates different types of information (corresponding to stimuli, 
goals, expectations, coping potential, and agency/blame). Given the tacit idea that the paradigmatic 
cases of emotion arise quickly and unexpectedly, a process is accepted as a valid cause of emotions 
only when it can occur automatically. Many theorists seem to think that the constructive nature of 
appraisal is not reconcilable with automaticity. Some appraisal theorists have therefore abandoned 
the idea that appraisal is a causal process. Others have argued that appraisal is a causal process, but 
they have relaxed the requirement that appraisal be constructive. According to these authors, the 
constructive character of the appraisal process is maintained only under optimal conditions. Under 
suboptimal conditions, previously computed and stored appraisal outputs or emotions must be 
reinstated on the basis of mere stimulus input. I have argued that the compatibility of constructive 
processes with automaticity should be a matter of empirical research. This research need not be 
hindered by difficulties to distinguish between the associative and rule-based mechanisms. The core 
characteristic of the appraisal process is that it is constructive, which is independent of the distinction 
between associative and rule-based. 
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I discussed two sets of studies that were specifically designed to investigate the automaticity 
of constructive processes in appraisal. A first set of studies supported the hypothesis that integration 
of stimuli and goals can be automatic. Another set (of which only one study was already conducted) 
was concerned with the automatic integration of valence and coping potential. These studies 
constitute the first support in favor of the possibility that constructive appraisals can be automatic. 
Based on these empirical data, I propose an elaboration of process assumptions in appraisal theory. I 
argue that automaticity is not an exclusive feature of stimulus-based memory retrieval and that it can 
extend to constructive processes that integrate stimulus input and goals (and perhaps other types of 
information). Constructive appraisal must not be relegated to occasions in which people have 
abundant opportunity (time, attentional capacity, conscious stimulus input) and the intention to 
engage in it. It can also occur under less optimal conditions. Thus, the flexibility that comes with 
constructive appraisal need not disappear under suboptimal conditions. Emotions that occur under 
suboptimal conditions may still be adequately tuned to the motivational state of the organism, and 
perhaps other types of information such as coping potential and agency/blame. 
Evidence for automatic constructive appraisal is necessary but not sufficient for accepting that 
constructive appraisal is the cause of automatically elicited emotions. Evidence for automatic 
constructive appraisal indicates that constructive appraisal is still a candidate cause of emotions that 
arise automatically, but it does not show that constructive appraisals are the actual cause of emotions, 
or that they can be. I confirm above that we did succeed in manipulating appraisals in our studies (at 
least according to my functional definition). I do not claim, however, that these appraisals were 
sufficient to elicit full-blown, intense emotions. As explained above, appraisal is not a sufficient 
cause of emotion. A stimulus must also be appraised as goal relevant, and the goal at stake must be 
highly important. The events of winning and not winning points may have been relevant for the goal 
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to win points or the goal to perform well in front of the experimenter, but it is likely that these goals 
were not important enough for participants to produce real emotions, at least no intense ones. Thus, 
our research does not demonstrate that constructive appraisals can be the cause of emotions that 
occur under suboptimal conditions. To demonstrate this, one must obtain evidence for (a) the 
presence of constructive appraisal, (b) the presence of an emotion, (c) the causal relation between 
―(a)‖ and ―(b)‖, and (d) that the constructive appraisal occurred under suboptimal conditions. There is 
no current research that investigates this issue. 
There have been attempts to back up the claim that appraisals can cause emotions, without 
specification of whether these appraisals are constructive vs. non-constructive or automatic vs. 
nonautomatic. Most appraisal studies try to find out which specific appraisal patterns cause which 
specific emotions (e.g., Roseman & Evdokas, 2004; Roseman, Antoniou, & José, 1996; Scherer, 
1993b; C. A. Smith & Ellsworth, 1985, 1987). Critics have argued that several hypotheses about 
relations between appraisal patterns and emotions are not supported by the data (e.g., Parkinson, 
2009). Moreover, they have argued that most of the evidence is based on correlational methods (e.g., 
self-report) that do not allow telling apart the following explanations: (a) that appraisals cause 
emotions, (b) that emotions cause appraisals, (c) that appraisals and emotions are caused by a third 
factor, (d) that appraisals are part of emotions, and (e) that appraisals and emotions are related in 
people‘s minds but not in reality (cf. Parkinson, 1997). In my opinion, incorrect hypotheses about 
relations between specific appraisal patterns and specific emotions should be replaced by better ones 
and so should methods that lack the power to demonstrate causal relations. It seems a bit too soon, 
however, to bury the hypothesis that (constructive and non-constructive) appraisals can and often do 
cause emotions, even under suboptimal conditions. 
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Appendix: Glossary of Terms 
Cognition: Views of cognition vary from broad to narrow (see Moors, 2007, for a taxonomy of 
definitions of cognition). An example of a broad view is that cognitive processes are 
representation-mediated. Representations intervene when stimulus-output relations are 
variable. Examples of variable input-output relations can be found in mere exposure effects, 
conditioning effects, and constructive processes (such as constructive appraisals). Examples 
of narrow views are that cognitive processes operate on propositional representations, that 
they are non-automatic, that they rely on rule-based mechanisms, that they are cortical, and 
that they have a cognitive (as opposed to emotional) output. Examples of cognitive outputs 
are gender, size, color, and location. Examples of emotional outputs are emotions, valence, 
and arousal. 
Emotion: I distinguish between the terms emotion and emotional episode. The term emotional 
episode covers anything starting from the stimulus to the later components or the immediate 
consequences of the emotion. The notion of emotional episode is thus potentially broader 
than the notion of emotion. According to most emotion theories, an emotional episode is a 
compound of appraisal (cognitive component), subjective experience (feeling component), 
action tendencies (motivational component), central and peripheral physiological responses 
(somatic component), and expressive behavior (motor component). Emotion theories disagree 
about the exact number and nature of the components they include, the order in which they 
place them within the emotional episode (and hence the components they consider to be 
causes and consequences), and the component(s) that they identify as ―the emotion‖ (cf. 
Moors, 2009). 
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Goal: The term can be used in two senses: (a) to refer to an end state in the future to which an 
organism is directed, and (b) to refer to a representation of that end state that drives the 
organism. Moreover, I use the word goal in a broad sense covering all kinds of motivational 
concepts such as concerns, desires, needs, drives, and standards. 
Perceptual representation: A representation with a perceptual format. Perceptual representations are 
contrasted with propositional representations. According to some authors, perceptual 
representations are image-like; they have sensory or perceptual features. Some authors add 
motor features, calling them embodied representations. According to others, perceptual 
representations are those that a person entertains without ascribing truth value to them. For 
example, one can perceive standing on the Eiffel tower as dangerous without believing it for a 
fact. 
Propositional representation: A representation with a propositional format. The term propositional 
indicates that there is a correspondence between the features of this representation and the 
features of propositions. According to some authors, the feature in common is that they are 
verbal-like (as opposed to image-like). According to others, the feature in common is that 
they are compositional (composed of parts that can be recombined). Still others think that the 
feature of interest is that propositions have truth value and that the content of a propositional 
representation is something to which the person ascribes truth value, something that he/she 
believes. 
Valence: Valence is considered to be a variable (or set of variables) with minimally two values: 
positive and negative. The term has been used as a predicate of stimuli, feelings, action 
tendencies, responses, and emotions (Brosch & Moors, 2009). When used as a predicate of 
stimuli, valence can also be seen as the content of the representations that a person has after 
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appraisal of the stimulus (cf. the appraisal variables of intrinsic valence and motivational 
valence). This content can be said to influence the valence of feelings, action tendencies, and 
responses. To the extent that the latter are considered components of emotions, emotions can 
inherit the valence of these components and be classified as positive (e.g., happiness, pride) 
or negative (e.g., anger, guilt) as well. Emotions can also be classified as positive (e.g., guilt) 
or negative (e.g., pride) in relation to their role in social interactions and ethical norms 
(Solomon & Stone, 2002). 
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Endnotes 
1
 One could reply, however, that it is not pointless to say that adding the eggs to the dough is (part of) the cause of the 
cake. It should further be noted that some proponents of the first strategy have argued against the strict separation of 
causes and consequences within the emotional episode in general, but not against the particular proposal of appraisal as a 
cause of emotion. According to them, talk of cause and effect obscures the real issues that emotion theory should deal 
with. 
2
 Several appraisal theorists leave room for a third mode of appraisal: the sensory-motor mode (Leventhal & Scherer, 
1987). In this mode, performance is based on the activation of pre-wired stimulus-response connections. This mechanism 
is invoked to explain that certain stimuli elicit emotions without prior learning. 
3 
The claim expressed in the second strategy that most appraisal theorists only provide a functional description of the 
appraisal process does not imply acceptance of a dual (or multi) mode theory of appraisal. On the other hand, arguing that 
appraisal theories have not made claims about mechanisms goes well with the view that appraisal is not dedicated to one 
kind of mechanism (rule-based), but that there may be several. 
4 
The distinction between connectionist and dynamic systems models has been characterized in different ways. Some view 
connectionist models as a subclass of the dynamic systems view. Others argue that dynamic systems theory is more 
extreme than connectionism, because connectionism postulates the existence of subsymbolic representations whereas 
dynamic systems theory does away with all kinds of representations. 
5 
Goal relevance and goal conduciveness might, in principle, also be delivered by a mechanism of direct memory 
retrieval. It is not unthinkable that certain stimuli are tagged in memory as goal (ir)relevant or goal (in)congruent as a 
result of prior learning. Presentation of these stimuli may trigger activation of their associated goal-(ir)relevant or goal-
(in)congruent meaning. 
6 
In reality, the prime color was independent of the participants‘ key-press responses. Because of the rapid alternation of 
the letters during the goal-inducing phase, participants were not aware that feedback was bogus. 
7
 In these articles, we used ―motivational valence‖ as another term for ―goal conduciveness‖. 
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Figure Caption 
Figure 1. Possible trials in a standard affective priming task. 
Figure 2. Possible trials in Experiment 1 of Moors and De Houwer (2001). 
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Box 1: Definition and Diagnosis of Automatic vs. Non-automatic Processes 
Contemporary feature-based views define automaticity as an umbrella term for a number of 
individual features such as uncontrolled, unintentional, unconscious, efficient, and fast (Bargh, 1992; 
Moors & De Houwer, 2006a). These features can be defined as follows. An uncontrolled process is 
one that is not influenced by a person‘s processing goals. Processing goals can either be promoting 
(e.g., the goal to engage in the process) or counteracting (e.g., the goals to stop, alter, or avoid the 
process). A process is uncontrolled in the promoting sense when it is not caused by the goal to 
engage in it. Another word for uncontrolled in the promoting sense is unintentional. A process is 
uncontrolled in the counteracting sense when it is not counteracted (stopped, altered, or avoided) by 
the goal to do so (stop, alter, or avoid). A process is unconscious when the person has no awareness 
of it. It may be noted that an unconscious process can operate on a conscious or an unconscious input. 
An efficient (also called effortless) process is one that makes minimal use of attentional capacity. 
Finally, a fast process is one that is completed within a short amount of time. 
These definitions of automaticity features can be reformulated in terms of operating 
conditions. For example, a process is uncontrolled in the promoting sense (unintentional) when the 
goal to engage in it is not (or only a redundant) part of the set of conditions that is sufficient for the 
process to operate. A process is uncontrolled in the counteracting sense when it operates in the 
absence of, or despite the presence of, the goal to counteract the process. A process (or the input to a 
process) is unconscious when it operates under the condition of a lack of awareness of the process (or 
of the input). A process is efficient when it operates under the condition of minimal attentional 
capacity. A process is fast when it can be completed under the condition of minimal time. In short, a 
process is automatic when it operates under suboptimal conditions (such as when there is minimal 
time, minimal attentional capacity, no conscious input, and/or no intention to engage in the process); 
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a process is non-automatic when it operates only under optimal conditions (such as when there is 
abundant time, abundant attentional capacity, conscious input, and/or the intention to engage in the 
process). 
In addition to a feature-based view of automaticity, contemporary investigators favor a 
gradual view of automaticity (Moors & De Houwer, 2006a, 2007; Shiffrin, 1988). This gradualness is 
manifested in two ways. First, a process can be automatic with regard to some but not other features. 
This means that it may occur under a mix of optimal and suboptimal conditions (Bargh, 1992). For 
example, a process may be both unintentional and nonefficient. Second, each automaticity feature can 
itself be considered as gradual. Time and attentional capacity can be more or less available; processes 
(or stimulus input) can be more or less conscious (if a gradual view of consciousness is endorsed); 
goals to engage in or counteract a process can be achieved to a more or less extent. Although a 
gradual view of automaticity is theoretically the most cautious approach, it does not provide an 
empirical criterion to separate automatic processes from non-automatic ones. This problem can be 
met by making only relative conclusions about automaticity. This means specifying the features of 
automaticity that apply and choosing a subjective criterion as a standard for comparison. For 
example, a process may be more efficient than another process, more efficient than before practice, or 
more efficient than what is generally expected. Another example of a subjective criterion can be 
found in the research literature on visual search tasks (e.g., an angry face is shown amidst neutral 
faces and set size is manipulated). Processing of the target (e.g., angry face) is called efficient when 
an increase in set size does not lead to an increase in reaction times, and it is agreed that this is the 
case when the slope is below 10 ms (Horstmann, 2007). 
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Box 2: Definition and Diagnosis of Rule-based vs. Associative Mechanisms 
As stated above, the distinction between associative and rule-based can be situated on the algorithmic 
level of process description. In a rule-based mechanism, a mental rule is applied to an input (or a 
representation thereof) and computation of the rule produces an output. In an associative mechanism, 
an input activates stored representations of similar past inputs. This activation, in turn, spreads to 
associated stored representations, which determine the output. As an example, consider that an output 
of positive or negative valence can be determined either by comparing the stimulus with the person‘s 
current goal, or by activating a previously associated valence tag in memory. Despite the fact that 
both mechanisms seem intuitively very different, it is notoriously difficult to find a formal criterion 
that captures the distinction between them. This, in turn, complicates the task of developing an 
empirical criterion to separate the associative mechanism from rule-based ones. Such an empirical 
criterion is essential if one is dedicated to investigating whether rule-based mechanisms can operate 
automatically. 
I briefly discuss some of the criteria that have been proposed in the literature and explain why 
they are invalid or why they do not lead to empirical criteria (for a more elaborate review of criteria, 
see discussions by Hahn & Chater, 1998; Moors & De Houwer, 2006b). One criterion is that rule-
based mechanisms can be described by IF-THEN rules (Kruglanski, Erb, Pierro, Mannetti, & Chun, 
2006). As an example, consider the rule that might be required for the computation of goal 
conduciveness: ―IF S = G THEN positive ELSE negative‖, with S standing for stimulus (or actual 
state) and G standing for goal (or desired state). The criterion that only rule-based mechanisms can be 
described by IF-THEN rules is easily dismissed by pointing out that the associative mechanism can 
also be described by an IF-THEN rule (Hahn & Chater, 1998; Sloman, 1996). For example, ―IF 
chocolate cake THEN positive‖. 
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A second criterion is that rule-based mechanisms but not associative ones can be described by 
abstract rules (e.g., Sloman, 1996; E. E. Smith, Langston, & Nisbett, 1992) in which the premise (the 
IF-part) contains variables. Variables are abstract representations that can be instantiated in more than 
one way (i.e., with more than one constant). In the abstract rule ―IF S = G THEN positive ELSE 
negative‖, the variables S and G can be instantiated with an infinite range of stimuli and goals. 
Associations fit the format of non-abstract rules in which the premise contains only constants. 
Constants are representations of concrete or even unique instances. In the non-abstract rule ―IF 
chocolate cake THEN positive‖, the constant ―chocolate cake‖ cannot be instantiated by other 
stimuli. Based on the second criterion one might be inclined to say that abstract rules but not non-
abstract rules allow for generalization toward novel stimuli. This is no longer true, however, when the 
second criterion is supplemented with a third criterion. 
The third criterion spells out that rule-based mechanisms can operate only when there is a 
perfect match between the input and the premise, whereas the associative mechanism can also 
operate when there is a partial match between input and premise or stored representation (Hahn & 
Chater, 1998). The abstract rule ―IF S = G THEN positive ELSE negative‖ cannot be computed 
unless a value for S and G is available. The non-abstract rule ―IF chocolate cake THEN positive‖ can 
be applied to any stimulus that bears some similarity with the chocolate cake figuring in the premise 
(the more similarity, the stronger activation of the memory trace will be). 
Due to the complementary forces of abstraction and partial matching, both the associative 
mechanism and rule-based ones can account for generalization toward new stimuli. In the case of 
rule-based mechanisms, generalization is obtained by virtue of abstract variables; in the case of the 
associative mechanism, generalization is obtained by virtue of partial matching. It may further be 
noted that abstraction is a gradual notion (Hahn & Chater, 1998; Pothos, 2005). The variables 
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figuring in abstract rules and the constants figuring in non-abstract rules occupy two points on a 
continuum. Variables can be substituted by a larger class of instances than constants can, but the 
variables that figure in abstract rules often cannot be substituted by just any constant. For instance, in 
the abstract rule ―IF S = G THEN positive ELSE negative‖, S and G must be instantiated by a 
stimulus and a goal, not by just anything. Conversely, constants often hold some level of abstraction. 
For instance, in the non-abstract rule ―IF chocolate cake THEN positive‖, the representation of 
chocolate cake can be instantiated by more than one unique chocolate cake. The fact that no objective 
line can be drawn between variables and constants is reflected in the idea that activation of stored 
knowledge can be based on concrete as well as abstract similarities (cf. Goldstone, 1994; Hummel & 
Holyoak, 2003; Redington & Chater, 1996). Thus, evidence for generalization toward stimuli that 
share abstract (but not concrete) features with previously acquired ones (Marcus, Vijayan, Bandi Rao, 
& Vishton, 1999; Reber, 1989) is equally compatible with rule-based as with associative accounts 
(Redington & Chater, 1996; but see E. E. Smith et al., 1996; Sloman & Rips, 1998). 
 
